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Abstract
This study explores the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in a two-country model of
directed technical change in which the market size of each country determines the incentives
for innovation. We nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union
leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two important
implications on innovation. First, it reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth.
Second, it causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a
negative e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages in the long run. We also calibrate
our model to data in the US and the UK. We nd that the degree of unionswage preference
must be stronger in the UK than in the US in order for the calibrated economies to replicate
the simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in the two countries.
We also explore the quantitative implications of labor unions on social welfare and relative
wage across countries. In summary, our calibrated model is able to explain about half of the
decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy model of
directed technical change. We consider a two-country model in which the market size of each
country determines the incentives for innovation. Our model di¤ers from other models of directed
technical change in the literature by featuring labor unions that bargain with employers over
wages and employment. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we nd that an increase in the
bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic
economy. In contrast, an increase in the bargaining power of an employment-oriented union leads
to an increase in employment. Empirical studies1 often nd that unionization has a negative e¤ect
on employment, which is consistent with our result under a wage-oriented union. This result has
two important implications on innovation. First, by decreasing employment, an increase in the
bargaining power of a wage-oriented union reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth.
This theoretical implication is consistent with empirical studies2 that nd negative e¤ects of unions
on innovation and growth. Second, by decreasing employment and the market size of the domestic
economy, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union causes innovation to be
directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative long-run e¤ect on domestic wages
relative to foreign wages. In the long run, this negative e¤ect of directed technical change on
relative wage income across countries would dominate the positive e¤ect of labor unions on wages
if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is su¢ ciently large.
We also calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to provide a quantitative analysis.
Figure 1a plots the HP-ltered trends of labor income share of GDP from 1980 to 2007 in the US
and the UK.3 This gure shows a well-documented stylized fact that the labor share of income has
gradually declined since the early 1980s. Figure 1b plots the HP-ltered trends of unemployment
rates in the two countries.4 This gure shows that unemployment has also gradually declined in
these two countries until 2007.5 We calibrate our model to compute the degree of unionswage
preference and the decrease in their bargaining power that enable the model to replicate this
simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in the two countries. We nd
that the degree of unionswage preference must be stronger in the UK than in the US in order
for the calibrated economies to match the data. We also explore the quantitative implications on
social welfare and relative wage across the two countries. In summary, our calibrated model is
able to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980
to 2007. Finally, we nd that both countries gain from the decrease in unionsbargaining power,
but the welfare improvement in the UK is greater than that in the US due to changes in relative
wage income.
1See for example Montgomery (1989), Blanchower et al. (1991), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Krol and
Svorny (2007).
2See for example Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch and Link (1987), Acs and Audretsch (1988), Carmeci and Mauro
(2003) and Bradley et al. (2013).
3Data source: OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs.
4Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and UK O¢ ce for National Statistics.
5We do not consider data after 2007 because of the nancial crisis.
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This study relates to the literature on labor unions. Early studies in this literature focus on the
formulation of labor unionsobjective function; see for example Oswald (1985) for a survey. We
follow a common approach in the literature to specify a Stone-Geary union objective function over
wages and employment. Pemberton (1988) provides a microeconomic foundation for this union
objective function as "the outcome of an internal bargain between the leadership and membership"
in a managerial union. Our study relates most closely to a recent branch of this literature that
explores the e¤ects of labor unions on innovation and economic growth. Palokangas (1996) is an
early study in this literature, and subsequent studies by Palokangas (2000, 2004), Boone (2000),
Lingens (2003, 2007) and Chang et al. (2014) also analyze the e¤ects of labor unions in R&D-based
growth models. Palokangas (1996, 2000, 2004) nds that increasing the bargaining power of labor
union serves to increase economic growth, whereas Boone (2000) nds that labor union dampens
economic growth. Lingens (2003, 2007) nds that labor union has both positive and negative e¤ects
on growth. Chang et al. (2014) also nd that labor union has both a negative growth e¤ect via
unemployment and a positive growth e¤ect via endogenous market structure, and these two e¤ects
exactly o¤set each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect on growth. Our theoretical model is able
to replicate (via an alternative mechanism) the above results that increasing the bargaining power
of labor unions can have a positive e¤ect on growth and innovation (under an employment-oriented
union), a negative e¤ect on growth and innovation (under a wage-oriented union) and a neutral
e¤ect on growth and innovation (when the union is neither wage nor employment oriented).6
More importantly, in addition to analyzing the e¤ects of labor unions on the level of innovation
in a closed economy as is common in the literature, our study also explores the e¤ects of labor
unions on the direction of innovation and wage income inequality across countries, complementing
the abovementioned studies in the literature. Furthermore, unlike previous studies that focus
on qualitative analysis, we calibrate our model to aggregate data to explore the quantitative
implications of labor unions on the macroeconomy. Aghion et al. (2001) also considers the
relationship between labor unions and directed technical change. They analyze the endogenous
6Chang et al. (2007) also nd that unionswage preference determines the e¤ects of their bargaining power
on economic growth, but they consider an AK-type growth model in which economic growth is driven by capital
accumulation. Our study complements their interesting analysis by exploring the e¤ects of labor unions in an
R&D-based growth model of directed technical change.
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formation of labor unions but take innovation as an exogenous change in productivity parameters,
whereas our study provides a complementary analysis by taking the existence of labor unions as
given and exploring their e¤ects on endogenous directed technical change.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides
analytical results. Section 4 conducts a quantitative analysis. The nal section concludes. Proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we consider an open-economy version of the R&D-based growth model originated
from the seminal study by Romer (1990).7 In the model, there are two countries: Home and
Foreign. Final goods are produced by combining intermediate goods from the two countries via
a standard CES Armington aggregator. Intermediate goods in each country are produced using
domestic labor and di¤erentiated monopolistic inputs. The number of varieties of these di¤eren-
tiated inputs increases over time as a result of R&D. In each country, there is an economy-wide
labor union that bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine
wage and employment, which in turn determines the market size of each country. As a result,
changes in employment in a country potentially a¤ect the direction of innovation across countries
as in the model of directed technical change in Acemoglu (1998, 2002).8 The novelty of this study
is that we explore the e¤ects of labor unions in the Acemoglu model and focus on the direction of
innovation across countries instead of sectors.
2.1 Household
In the Home country h, there is a representative household, which has the following lifetime utility
function:
Uh =
1Z
0
e t ln cht dt, (1)
where cht denotes consumption of nal goods at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:9
_aht = rta
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t + b
h
t
 
Lh   lht
  ht   cht . (2)
aht is the amount of nancial assets (i.e., the equity shares of rms that generate monopolistic
prots) owned by the household in the Home country, and rt is the real interest rate.10 wht is the
7See also Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) for other
seminal studies on the R&D-based growth model and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey of this literature.
8Other inuential studies on directed technical change include Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001),
Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009).
9We also impose the usual no-Ponzi-game condition that requires the households lifetime budget constraint to
be satised.
10rt is not indexed by a country superscript because we consider a global nancial market. Our derivations are
robust to any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. One special case is that all domestic (foreign)
rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household.
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wage rate in the Home country. Lh is the inelastic supply of labor, and lht is employment. Therefore,
Lh   lht is unemployment, and the unemployment rate is uht  1   lht =Lh. bht is unemployment
benet, and ht is a lump-sum tax levied by the government on the household. From standard
dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is11
_cht
cht
= rt   . (3)
There are analogous conditions and variables with a superscript f in the Foreign country.
2.2 Final goods
The production of nal goods is perfectly competitive, and they are freely traded across countries.
Final goods are produced with the following CES Armington aggregator:
Yt =
h
(Xht )
(" 1)=" + (1  )(Xft )(" 1)="
i"=(" 1)
, (4)
whereXht andX
f
t are respectively intermediate goods produced in the Home and Foreign countries.
" > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of intermediate goods,12 and 
determines their relative importance. We choose nal goods as the numeraire, and the standard
price index of nal goods is
1 =
h
"
 
P ht
1 "
+ (1  )"(P ft )1 "
i1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods to one. P ht and P
f
t are respectively the price of X
h
t and
Xft . The conditional demand functions for intermediate goods are
Xht =


P ht
"
Yt, (6)
Xft =

1  
P ft
"
Yt. (7)
2.3 Intermediate goods and labor union
There is a unit continuum of rms producing intermediate goods in the each country. The pro-
duction function of Xht is given by
Xht = (l
h
t )

Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di, (8)
11Also, the transversality condition requires rt > _aht =a
h
t , which holds on the balanced growth path given the log
utility function and  > 0.
12See Broda and Weinstein (2006) for empirical evidence on " > 1.
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where lht is the employment of labor and x
h
t (i) is di¤erentiated input i 2 [0; Nht ]. We also impose
the following parameter restrictions: ;  2 (0; 1) and  +  < 1. Here we follow the formulation
in Chang et al. (2007) to assume decreasing returns to scale,13 allowing the rms to have positive
prot in order to facilitate the bargaining process between the employersfederation and the labor
union. The prot function of the representative rm is
ht = P
h
t X
h
t   wht lht  
Z Nht
0
pht (i)x
h
t (i)di, (9)
where pht (i) is the price of x
h
t (i). The rm chooses x
h
t (i) to maximize 
h
t . The conditional demand
function for xht (i) is
pht (i) = P
h
t (l
h
t )
[xht (i)]
 1. (10)
Departing from the usual treatment without labor union, we follow previous studies, such as
Palokangas (1996), Lingens (2007) and Chang et al. (2007), to consider an economy-wide labor
union that bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine wage wht
and employment lht . We consider a closed shop union under which only union members are eligible
for employment. As in Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007), we consider a managerial
union whose objective is inuenced by the union leaders desire for a larger membership and
the membersdesire for a higher wage. Formally, the unions objective is given by a standard
Stone-Geary function:
Oht = (w
h
t   bht )!
h
(lht )
h . (11)
The parameter !h > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workersincremental wage
income from employment (i.e., wage minus unemployment benet). The parameter h > 0 mea-
sures the weight that the union places on membership. For simplicity, we normalize h to unity
and use !h to measure the weight that the union places on wage relative to membership; i.e., we
focus on h = 1 for the rest of the analysis.14 When !h > 1 (!h < 1), we refer to the union as
being wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employersfederation and the labor union bargain over wht and l
h
t . The generalized Nash
bargaining function is
max
wht ;l
h
t
Bht = (O
h
t )
h(ht )
1 h , (12)
where the parameter h 2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of the labor union relative to the
employers. The bargaining solutions are
@Bht
@wht
= 0, (w
h
t   bht )lht
ht
=
!hh
1  h , (13)
@Bht
@lht
= 0, w
h
t l
h
t   P ht Xht
ht
=
h
1  h . (14)
There are analogous conditions for wft and l
f
t in the Foreign country.
13This can be justied by the presence of a xed factor input owned by the rms.
14Our results are robust to h > 0 (derivations available upon request), but some of the expressions become more
complicated in this case.
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2.4 Di¤erentiated inputs
In each country, there is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated inputs i 2 [0; Nht ]. Each
di¤erentiated input i is produced by a monopolist who owns a patent on the production technology.
For simplicity, we follow Acemoglu (2002) to assume that these di¤erentiated inputs are produced
using nal goods. In particular, one unit of nal goods produces one unit of di¤erentiated input.
The prot function of the monopolist in industry i is given by
ht (i) = p
h
t (i)x
h
t (i)  xht (i) = P ht (lht )[xht (i)]   xht (i), (15)
where the second equality uses (10). Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to xht (i), we nd the familiar
prot-maximizing price of xht (i) given by p
h
t (i) = 1=. Substituting p
h
t (i) = 1= into (10) and (16)
yields
xht (i) = [
2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  xht , (16)
ht (i) =

1  


xht (i) =

1  


[2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  ht . (17)
There are analogous conditions for xft and 
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.5 R&D
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs investing in R&D in each country. The invention of a new
variety of di¤erentiated inputs in either country requires  units of nal goods. We consider the
lab-equipment R&D specication in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). In particular, the innovation
process in the Home country is given by
_Nht = R
h
t =, (18)
where Rht is the amount of nal goods devoted to R&D in the Home country. Suppose we denote
vht as the value of an invention in the Home country. Free entry in the R&D sector implies
(vht   ) _Nht = 0. (19)
The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
ht + _v
h
t
vht
, (20)
Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset,
where the asset return is the monopolistic prot ht plus any potential capital gain _v
h
t . There are
analogous conditions for vft in the Foreign country.
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2.6 Government
In each country, there is a government that determines unemployment benet and levies a lump-
sum tax on the household to balance the scal budget. The balanced-budget condition in the
Home country is
ht = b
h
t
 
Lh   lht

. (21)
To be consistent with balanced growth, we assume that unemployment benet bht is proportional
to the value of domestic output P ht X
h
t ; i.e., b
h
t = b
h
P ht X
h
t , where b
h
> 0 is a policy parameter.
There are analogous conditions for  ft and b
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of allocations fcht ; cft ; Yt; Xht ; Xft ; xht (i); xft (i); lht ; lft ; Rht ; Rft g, prices
frt; wht ; wft ; P ht ; P ft ; pht (i); pft (i); vht ; vft g and scal policies fht ;  ft ; bht ; bft g such that the following
conditions hold at each instance of time:
 the representative household in the Home country chooses fcht g to maximize utility taking
frt; wht ; bht ; ht g as given;
 the representative household in the Foreign country chooses fcft g to maximize utility taking
frt; wft ; bft ;  ft g as given;
 perfectly competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fP ht ; P ft g
as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Home country produce fXht g to maximize prot taking prices
fP ht ; pht (i)g as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Foreign country produce fXft g to maximize prot taking
prices fP ft ; pft (i)g as given;
 in the Home country, an economy-wide federation representing intermediate-goods rms
bargains with an economy-wide labor union to determine fwht ; lht g;
 in the Foreign country, an economy-wide federation representing intermediate-goods rms
bargains with an economy-wide labor union to determine fwft ; lft g;
 monopolistic rms in the Home country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxht (i)g and set fpht (i)g
to maximize prot;
 monopolistic rms in the Foreign country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxft (i)g and set
fpft (i)g to maximize prot;
 R&D rms in the Home country choose fRht g to maximize prot taking frt; vht g as given;
 R&D rms in the Foreign country choose fRft g to maximize prot taking frt; vft g as given;
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 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rht +Rft +Nht xht +N ft xft +
cht + c
f
t ;
 the government in the Home country balances its scal budget given by ht = bht
 
Lh   lht

;
 the government in the Foreign country balances its scal budget given by  ft = bft (Lf   lft ).
Here we rst solve for the equilibrium levels of employment in the two countries. Substituting
(8) and (10) into (9) yields the prot function of intermediate goods in the Home country given
by
ht = (1  )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di  wht lht = (1  )P ht Xht   wht lht . (22)
Substituting (22) into the bargaining solution in (14) yields
wht l
h
t =

 + h(1    )P ht (lht ) Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di =

 + h(1    )P ht Xht , (23)
where labor income share wht l
h
t =P
h
t X
h
t = + 
h(1    ) is increasing in the unions bargaining
power h. Then, substituting (23) into (22) yields
ht = (1  h)(1    )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di = (1  h)(1    )P ht Xht . (24)
Substituting (23), (24) and bht = b
h
P ht X
h
t into the bargaining solution in (13) yields the equilibrium
level of employment in the Home country given by
lht =
 + (1  !h)h(1    )
b
h
 lh, (25)
where employment lh is decreasing in the unions wage preference !h and is ambiguous with respect
to its bargaining power h depending on the value of !h. We impose parameter restrictions to
ensure lht 2 (0; Lh). By analogous inference, the equilibrium level of employment in the Foreign
country is given by
lft =
 + (1  !f )f (1    )
b
f
 lf . (26)
We also impose parameter restrictions to ensure lft 2 (0; Lf ). Equations (25) and (26) give the
equilibrium levels of employment regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤ the balanced
growth path.
Next we derive the relative wage across countries. Combining (6) and (7) yields the relative
demand function for intermediate goods given by
P ht
P ft
=

1  

Xht
Xft
 1="
. (27)
Substituting (16) into (8) yields the production of intermediate goods Xht given by
Xht = (l
h)=(1 )(2P ht )
=(1 )Nht . (28)
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Substituting (28) and the analogous condition for Xft into (27) yields
P ht
P ft
=


1  
 (1 )"
+(1 )"

lh
lf
  
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
  (1 )
+(1 )"
, (29)
which determines the relative price ofXht andX
f
t . Substituting (16) into (23) yields the equilibrium
wage rate in the Home country given by
wht = 
2=(1 )  + h(1    ) (P ht )1=(1 )(lh)  1  1  Nht . (30)
Combining (30) and the analogous expression for wft yields an expression for relative wage across
countries. If we substitute the relative price in (29) into this expression, we would obtain the
equilibrium relative wage given by
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )


1  
 "
+(1 )"

lh
lf
 ++(1  )"
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
 (1 )(" 1)
+(1 )"
, (31)
which is decreasing in relative employment lh=lf but increasing in relative technology Nht =N
f
t .
Equation (31) gives the equilibrium relative wage regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤
the balanced growth path. Proposition 1 characterizes the dynamic property of Nht =N
f
t .
Proposition 1 There is a unique and globally stable steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t .
When Nht =N
f
t is below (above) this steady-state value, N
h
t =N
f
t increases (decreases) until N
h
t =N
f
t
reaches the steady state, at which point Nht and N
f
t grow at the same rate.
Proof. See the appendix.
We now derive the steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t . In the long run, innovation takes
place in both countries; therefore, we have vht = , which in turn implies that _v
h
t = 0. Substituting
_vht = 0 into (20), we obtain the equilibrium value of an invention in the Home country given by
vh =
h
r
=

1  


[2P h(lh)]1=(1 )
r
, (32)
where the second equality follows from (17). Combining (32) with the analogous expression for
vf , we obtain the relative value of inventions across countries given by
vh
vf
=

P h
P f
1=(1 )
lh
lf
=(1 )
= 1, (33)
where the second equality follows from vh = vf = . Combining (29) and (33) yields the steady-
state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t given by
Nht
N ft
=


1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1)
, (34)
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which is increasing in relative employment lh=lf capturing the market-size e¤ect on the direction
of innovation across countries. We substitute (34) into (31) to derive the steady-state equilibrium
relative wage given by
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )


1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1) 1
, (35)
which is increasing in relative employment lh=lf if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater
than (1 + )=.
Finally, Lemma 1 derives the steady-state equilibrium growth rate, which is monotonically
increasing in the equilibrium levels of employment flh; lfg. Therefore, whenever labor unions a¤ect
employment, they also a¤ect economic growth in the same way.
Lemma 1 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of consumption is given by
g =
(1  )(1+)=(1 )

h
"
 
lh
(" 1)
+ (1  )"  lf(" 1)i 1(1 )(" 1)   . (36)
Proof. See the appendix.
3 Macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions
In this section, we explore the macroeconomic implications of labor unions. In particular, we are
interested in the e¤ects of a labor union becoming more wage oriented (i.e., !h increases) and
having more bargaining power relative to employers (i.e., h increases). In Section 3.1, we analyze
the e¤ects of increasing !h.15 In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of increasing h.
3.1 Wage preference of labor unions
Equation (25) shows that an increase in the unions wage preference !h leads to a decrease in
employment lh in the Home country. Intuitively, as the union in the Home country becomes more
wage oriented, it demands a higher wage and depresses labor demand. Given that employment
lf in the Foreign country is independent of !h, an increase in !h leads to a decrease in relative
employment lh=lf , which in turn increases relative wage wht =w
f
t across countries in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). This short-run increase in relative wage is partly due
to the direct e¤ect of the decrease in relative employment and partly due to an indirect e¤ect via
the increase in relative price P ht =P
f
t as shown in (29). In the long run, N
h
t =N
f
t decreases to a lower
steady-state value as shown in (34) because the decrease in relative employment lh=lf changes the
relative market size of the two countries and causes innovation to be directed towards the Foreign
country. This negative market-size e¤ect partly o¤sets and may even dominate the positive price
15The e¤ects of increasing unemployment benet b
h
are the same as increasing !h.
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e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t . Equation (35) shows that the overall e¤ect of !
h on wht =w
f
t would
be negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is su¢ ciently large (i.e., " > (1 + )=).
Finally, from Lemma 1, we see that the decrease in employment reduces economic growth in the
long run. We summarize these results in Proposition 2. Figure 2 plots the transitional path of
wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase in !
h at time t.
Proposition 2 As the labor union becomes more wage oriented, employment in the domestic
economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic economy
relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in employment
in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which causes
a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage in the long run is
negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by (1 + )=.
Finally, the e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium rate of economic growth is negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 2
3.2 Bargaining power of labor unions
In this subsection, we rst consider the case of a wage-oriented union (i.e., !h > 1). Equation
(25) shows that an increase in the unions bargaining power h leads to a decrease in employment
lh if and only if the union is wage oriented. This decrease in employment lh has a positive e¤ect
on the wage rate in the Home country as shown in (30). Furthermore, an increase in the unions
bargaining power increases the share of output that goes to wage income as shown in (23). These
two positive e¤ects on wht lead to an unambiguous increase in relative wage w
h
t =w
f
t in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). However, in the long run, the decrease in employment
lh exerts a negative market-size e¤ect on wht =w
f
t . This negative market-size e¤ect would dominate
the abovementioned positive e¤ects if the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
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intermediate goods is su¢ ciently large; i.e.,16
" > 1 +
!h
!h   1

1
 + h(1    )

 ". (37)
The transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to an increase in !
h is similar to Figure 2, except that
the threshold of " is now given by " instead of (1 + )=. Finally, from Lemma 1, we see that the
decrease in employment reduces economic growth in the long run. We summarize these results in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When a wage-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in the do-
mestic economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic
economy relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in em-
ployment in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which
causes a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall long-run e¤ect of increasing a wage-
oriented unions bargaining power on the relative wage is negative if and only if the substitution
elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by " in (37). Finally, the e¤ect on the steady-state
equilibrium rate of economic growth is negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
Next we consider an employment-oriented union (i.e., !h < 1). In this case, (25) shows that
an increase in the unions bargaining power h raises employment lh in the domestic economy.
Although this increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t as shown in
(31), the increase in h still increases relative wage wht =w
f
t in the short run. This positive short-run
e¤ect of !h on relative wage wht =w
f
t is due to the increase in the share of output that goes to wage
income as shown in (23). As for the long-run e¤ect of the unions bargaining power h on relative
wage wht =w
f
t , an increase in 
h further increases relative wage under an employment-oriented
union because the market-size e¤ect works in favor of increasing wht =w
f
t due to the increase in
employment lh. Finally, from Lemma 1, we see that this increase in employment also stimulates
economic growth in the long run. We summarize these results in Proposition 4. Figure 3 plots the
transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase in the bargaining power 
h of an
employment-oriented union at time t.
Proposition 4 When an employment-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in
the domestic economy increases. This increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on the wage
rate in the domestic economy. However, the increase in the unions bargaining power also increases
the share of output that goes to labor income. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage is positive
in the short run. In the long run, the increase in employment causes innovation to be directed to
the domestic economy, which leads to an additional positive e¤ect on the relative wage. Therefore,
the overall long-run e¤ect of increasing an employment-oriented unions bargaining power on the
relative wage is always positive. Finally, the e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium rate of economic
growth is also positive.
16It is useful to note that " > (1 + )= given an upper bound imposed on !h to ensure lh > 0 in (25).
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Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 3
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to see if it can replicate
the simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in Figure 1. In particular, we
assume that the decrease in labor income share is due to a decrease in workersbargaining power
fh; fg.17 Then, we compute the implied values of the unionswage preference f!h; !fg that
enable the model to deliver the observed decrease in the unemployment rates in the two countries.
Finally, we also explore the quantitative implications on social welfare and relative wage across
the two countries.
The model features the following parameters f; "; ; ; ; ; Lh; Lf ; bh; bf ; !h; !f ; h; fg. We
dene the US as the Home country h and the UK as the Foreign country f . We follow Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2012) to consider a standard value for the discount rate  = 0:05. As for the
elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign intermediate goods, we set " to 3.5, which
is within the range of empirical estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006). For the parameters in
the intermediate-goods production function (8), we set the degree of labor intensity  to 0.5 and
the intensity of intermediate goods  to 0.3. It is useful to note that the parameter  is the lower
bound of labor income share given by  + h(1      ) in the model. Given that labor income
share has fallen to as low as 0.54 in the US in recent years, we consider 0.5 to be a reasonable value
of . As for the R&D productivity parameter , we calibrate it using the long-run average growth
rate in the two economies, and g is about 2%. As for the share parameter  in the nal-goods
production function (4), we calibrate it using the relative wage of the two countries, and wht =w
f
t
is 1.45 in 1980.18 We calibrate the policy parameters fbh; bfg using data on the average value of
17For example, Kristal (2013) uses industry-level data to show that the decrease in labor income share in the US
since the early 1980s is due to the decrease in unionization and workersbargaining power; see also Kristal (2010)
and Judzik and Sala (2013) for evidence based on country-level data from a sample of countries including the UK
and the US.
18Data source: Penn World Table, and OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs.
14
unemployment benets as a share of GDP in the two countries.19 To match the unemployment
rates in the early 1980s, we calibrate the values of fLh; Lfg.20 We use the trend values of labor
income share in the two countries in 1980 and 2007 to calibrate respectively the values of fh; fg
in 1980 and 2007. Finally, we calibrate the values of f!h; !fg so that the calibrated economies
replicate the observed decrease in the unemployment rates from 8% to 5% in the US and from
10% to 5% in the UK. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 "     Lh Lf b
h
b
f
!h !f h f
0:05 3:5 0:5 0:3 9:67 0:51 137:1 43:7 0:38% 0:88% 1:13 1:96 0:8! 0:2 0:8! 0:7
Figure 1a shows that labor income shares in the US and the UK were about the same at 0.66
in 1980. By 2007, labor income share in the US falls to 0.54, whereas labor income share in the
UK decreases only slightly to 0.64. Our model provides the following structural interpretation
on this empirical pattern: the bargaining power of workers falls by a much larger degree in the
US than in the UK, as indicated in Table 1. Figure 1b shows that unemployment rates in the
two countries fall to a similar value of 5%. The fact that unemployment decreases in response
to a decrease in the bargaining power of workers implies that unions are wage-oriented (i.e.,
f!h; !fg > 1).21 Furthermore, the degree of wage orientation must be larger in the UK in order
for its unemployment rate to fall by a larger magnitude despite the smaller decrease in its workers
bargaining power. Table 1 shows that the degree of wage preference !f in the UK is 1.96, which is
larger than !h = 1:13 in the US. Under these values of f!h; !fg, decreasing the unions bargaining
power h from 0.8 to 0.2 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 8% to 5% in the US,
whereas decreasing f from 0.8 to 0.7 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 10% to 5%
in the UK.
In the rest of this section, we simulate the e¤ects of decreasing unions bargaining power
fh; fg on relative wage and welfare. Using (1), we can express the representative households
lifetime welfare on the balanced growth path as
U j =
1


ln cj0 +
g


, (38)
where j 2 fh; fg. To derive the balanced-growth level of consumption in each country, we need
to make an assumption on the distribution of assets across countries. Following the standard
treatment in the literature,22 we assume home bias in asset holding under which domestic (foreign)
rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household. Under this assumption, Lemma 2 derives
the following expression for ln cj0 and U
j, where the term N j0 in (39) is determined by (34):
19Data source: OECD Dataset on Social Expenditure.
20The calibrated value of 3.1 for Lh=Lf is slightly less than the relative labor-force size of about 4 in the 1980s.
21In the case of employment-oriented unions, decreasing their bargaining power would lead to lower employment
and higher unemployment.
22See for example Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
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Lemma 2 Under home bias in asset holding, the steady-state welfare function is given by
U j =
1


lnN j0 + ln



[(1 + ) + g]

+
g


. (39)
Proof. See the appendix.
We consider the same calibrated parameter values and the same changes in fh; fg as before.
The decrease in unionsbargaining power fh; fg leads to an increase in employment flh; lfg,
which in turn increases the long-run growth rate from 2% to 2.18%.23 This positive growth e¤ect
benets the two countries equally. However, the decrease in lh=lf (recall that unemployment falls
by more in the UK than in the US) causes innovation to be directed to the UK and gives rise to
a decrease in Nh=N f , which a¤ects the two countries di¤erently due to changes in relative wage
income. In the data, relative wage wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 in 1980 to 1.03 in 2007,
24 whereas
wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 to 1.22 in our simulation, which explains about half of the decrease
in relative wage in the data. Finally, we also simulate the welfare changes in the two countries.25
We nd that as a result of the increase in employment and growth, welfare improves in the US,
and the welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 5.94%. The welfare
improvement in the UK is even more signicant at 8.89% due to the increase in wage income
relative to the US. We summarize these results in Table 2.
Table 2: Simulated e¤ects on fwht =wft ; Uh; U fg
Data Model
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 1980 1:45 1:45
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 2007 1:03 1:22
Welfare changes in the US n=a 5:94%
Welfare changes in the UK n=a 8:89%
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy
model of directed technical change. We nd that the e¤ects of labor unions on employment,
innovation and economic growth are theoretically ambiguous and depend on their wage preference.
In the case of the US and the UK, wage-oriented unions seem to t the data better by enabling the
model to replicate the observed decrease in labor income share, unemployment and relative wage
23For example, Carmeci and Mauro (2003) estimate dynamic panel regressions using data on OECD countries
and nd that decreasing labor union density indeed has a positive e¤ect on long-run growth.
24From the Penn World Table, we obtain PPP-adjusted real income per worker. Then, we use OECD data on
labor income share to compute real wage income per worker in the two countries. OECD also provides direct data
on average annual wages, according to which relative wage of the two countries decreases from 1.30 in 1990 to 1.17
in 2007; unfortunately, earlier data is not available.
25We express welfare changes as equivalent variation in annual consumption.
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across countries. In this case, decreasing the bargaining power of unions stimulates employment
and economic growth, as some empirical studies (discussed in the introduction) tend to nd.
However, in other cases, decreasing the bargaining power of unions could reduce employment and
growth if the unions are employment-oriented instead. These theoretical ndings suggest that
there is no one-size-t-all policy when it comes to reforming existing labor market institutions,
such as labor unions, and policymakers should make an e¤ort to understand the country-specic
or even industry-specic e¤ects of labor unions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If Nht =N
f
t is smaller than its unique steady-state value in (34) (i.e.,
Nht =N
f
t < [=(1  )]"
 
lh=lf
(" 1)  ), then ht > ft must hold, and hence, vht = vft =  cannot
hold, noting (17) and (29). In fact, one can show that so long as Nht =N
f
t < ; 
h
t =rt = v
h
t =  and
vft < , implying _N
h
t > 0 and _N
f
t = 0. Following Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), we have demonstrated that only one type of innovation takes place o¤ the steady state.
Furthermore, the economy converges to the steady state and arrives there in nite time. In the
steady state, Nht =N
f
t is constant over time implying that N
h
t and N
f
t grow at the same rate. An
analogous argument can be applied to the case of Nht =N
f
t > .
Proof of Lemma 1. By (32) and vh = ; the interest rate is given by
r =
h

=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )

. (A1)
Using (A1), the Euler equation (3) becomes
_cht
cht
=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )

    g. (A2)
(5) can be rewritten as
P h =
h
" + (1  )"  P h=P f" 1i 1" 1 . (A3)
Substituting (34) into (29) leads to P h=P f =
 
lh=lf
 
. Applying this to (A3) and substituting
the resulting expression into (A2), we can obtain (36).
Proof of Proposition 2. It is shown in (25) that an increase in !h causes a decrease in
employment lh, which increases wht =w
f
t in the short run (i.e., taking N
h
t =N
f
t as given) through
(31). In the long run, the decrease in lh reduces Nht =N
f
t (i.e., innovation to be directed towards
the Foreign country) given " > 1; see (34). Finally, as shown in (35), this results in a reduction in
wht =w
f
t if and only if ("  1) > 1; which is equivalent to " > (1 + )=. Finally, for the e¤ect of
!h on long-run growth, use Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under a wage-oriented union, we have !h > 1. We rst address the
short run by taking Nht =N
f
t as given in (31). Using this fact and (25), we can rewrite (31) as
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[+ 
h(1   )]   +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )" ln

 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A4)
where we have omitted some exogenous terms for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A4) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    ) +
 +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )"
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A5)
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which is positive given !h > 1. In the rest of this proof, we address the long run by considering
(35). In an analogous manner, we can derive from (35)
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[ + 
h(1    )] + [("  1)  1] ln  + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A6)
where some exogenous terms are omitted again for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A6) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    )   [("  1)  1]
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) . (A7)
From (A7), it can be shown that @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h < 0 if and only if (37) holds. Finally, for the
e¤ect of h on long-run growth, use Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under an employment-oriented union, we have !h < 1. First, we
consider the short-run e¤ect by examining (A4) and (A5). In (A5), @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is monotoni-
cally increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore, @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is
always positive for any !h > 0. Then, we examine the long-run e¤ect using (A7). If ("  1) > 1,
then @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h > 0 must hold because !h < 1. If ("   1) < 1, then @ ln(wht =wft )=@h in
(A7) is monotonically increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore,
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is always positive for any !h 2 (0; 1). Finally, for the e¤ect of h on long-run
growth, use Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the assumption of home bias in asset holding, one can rewrite (2)
as
vht _N
h
t = rtv
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   cht , (A8)
where vht =  and hence _v
h
t = 0. On the balanced growth path, we can solve (A8) for c
h
t :
cht = 
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   gNht , (A9)
using rtvht = 
h
t and _N
h
t = gN
h
t . Using (17), we obtain
htN
h
t = 
(1+)=(1 ) (1  ) (lh)P h 11  Nht . (A10)
Here it holds that
(lh)P h =
h
"(lh)(" 1) + (1  )"  lf(" 1)i 1" 1 =   (g + )
(1+)=(1 ) (1  )
1 
, (A11)
where the rst equality comes from (A3) with P h=P f =
 
lh=lf
 
and the second equality comes
from (36). Using (23) and (24), we obtain
ht + w
h
t l
h
t = (1  )P ht Xht = 2=(1 )

(lh)P h
1=(1 )
Nht , (A12)
where we have used (28) for the second equality. Substituting (A10)-(A12) into (A9) yields
cht = 

(1 + ) + g


Nht . (A13)
Substituting (A13) into (38) yields (39). Finally, cft can be derived analogously.
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